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Case No. 20050153-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Joshua O. Herschi, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for (1) possession of marijuana in a 
drug free zone with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004); (2) possession of 
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); (3) possession of Oxycontin 
without a valid prescription in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); (4) possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1)(b)(iii) (West 2004); and (5) possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the officers comply with the knock-and-announce rule where they 
entered defendant's residence only after defendant opened the door 10 to 15 
inches, the officers announced their authority and purpose, and defendant 
responded by trying to shut the door? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings 
underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. 
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ^ 11, 100 P.3d 1222. It reviews the trial court's legal 
conclusions non-def erentially for correctness, including the court's application of 
the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ 11,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (West 2004) 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any 
building, room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the 
officer executing the warrant may use such force as is reasonably 
necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response 
or he is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
( 2 ) . . . . 
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S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
On January 6, 2004, police searched defendant's residence pursuant to a 
search warrant. R. 6-10,18. Defendant was later charged with four drug-related 
offenses occurring in a drug-free zone and a weapons offense. R. 1-3, 36-39. 
After holding a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound defendant over for trial 
on all counts as charged. R. 21-22. 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing 
that the officers executing the search warrant failed to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment's knock-and-announce rule. R. 28-35,49-53,139-50. After holding a 
hearing on the matter, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. R. 
173-74,178-82, 251. Thereafter, and pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant 
pled guilty to all five counts as charged, but reserved the right to appeal the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 192-203, 207-08. 
Defendant was sentenced to indeterminate terms of one-to-fifteen years in 
prison for each second degree felony, zero-to-five years in prison for the third 
degree felony, and 365 days in jail for the class A misdemeanor. R. 227-30. The 
trial court suspended the sentences and placed defendant on probation. R. 227-
30. The court required that defendant serve one year in jail, but permitted his 
release after eight months if accepted into the Northern Utah Community 
Correctional Center. R. 229. 
Pursuant to the parties' plea agreement, the State stipulated to defendant's 
application for a certificate of probable cause. R. 234-36. The trial court 
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suspended defendant's sentence pending appeal. R. 232-33. Defendant timely 
appealed. R. 240-41. 
Summary of Facts 
On January 6, 2004, Sgt. Dennis Simonson secured a warrant to search 
defendant's residence in Logan, Utah. R. 6-10,178. At approximately 8:30 that 
evening, Sgt. Simonson and Deputy Bill Nyberg approached defendant's door to 
execute the warrant. R. 251: 7,9-10. Additional officers positioned themselves 
nearby. R. 251: 8. Sgt. Simonson wore a jacket with his police badge pinned to 
the front 6 to 8 inches from his chin. R. 251: 7-8. Sgt. Simonson knocked on the 
door. R. 251: 7,10. Upon hearing the knock, defendant asked who was there. R. 
251: 4, 7,10. Sgt. Simonson identified himself by his first name, responding, 
"Dennis." R. 251: 7,10. Defendant asked a second time who was at the door, 
and again, Sgt. Simonson responded, "Dennis." R. 251: 4, 7,10. 
Defendant walked to the door and opened it about one foot wide. R. 251: 
4-5,7,10. Sgt. Simonson loudly announced," [P]olice, search warrant." R. 251:7-
8, 10. After Sgt. Simonson announced his authority and purpose, defendant 
began to push the door closed. R. 251: 8,11. Sgt. Simonson and Deputy Nyberg 
responded by pushing the door in until they could enter the apartment. R. 251: 
8,10-11. Deputy Nyberg took a baby whom defendant was holding in his arms 
and Sgt. Simonson handcuffed defendant. R. 251:10. 
The search of defendant's residence uncovered, among other things, one 
bag of marijuana, digital scales, a bundle of plastic baggies, 27 small baggies of 
marijuana, two baggies of methamphetamine, two Oxycontin pills, and a firearm 
with a 30 round magazine. R. 18. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the officers did not comply with the knock and 
announce rule. This argument lacks merit. Defendant opened the door and the 
officer announced his authority and purpose. When defendant attempted to 
shut the door, the officers were not required to wait any further to determine 
whether defendant would eventually consent to their entry. They reasonably 
inferred his refusal from his attempt to shut the door. Moreover, the officer's use 
of the alleged ruse (identifying himself by his first name before the door was 
opened) did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE OFFICERS' ENTRY INTO DEFENDANTS RESIDENCE AFTER 
ANNOUNCING THEIR AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE WAS 
LAWFUL. 
"When executing a search warrant, an officer must ordinarily give notice 
of his authority and purpose before entering the premises to be searched/' State 
v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988). This "knock and announce" rule 
originated from the common law and is now recognized as an element of the 
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 
U.S. 927,934 (1995). It is also incorporated into Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-23-210 (West 2004) (permitting an officer's forcible entry "if, after notice of his 
authority and purpose, there is no response or he is not admitted with 
reasonable promptness"). 
Implicit in the knock-and-announce rule is the requirement that "once 
having given the required notice, the officer 'must wait a reasonable period of 
time before he may break and enter into the premises to be searched/" 2 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(c), at 672 (2004) (citation omitted). As a 
general rule, "the police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the 
time necessary to infer one." United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31,43 (2003). On the 
Although generally referred as the "knock-and-announce" rule, a 
"knock" is not required. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931,115 S.Ct. at 1916 (referring 
only to a requirement that officers " announce[ ] their presence and authority 
prior to entering"); State v. Floor, 2005 UT 320,1f 11,119 P.3d 305 (holding that 
"the statute obviously does not require that a law enforcement official actually 
knock to comply fully with the requirements of the statute"). 
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other hand, police need not wait to infer a refusal if an exigency "maturefs]" 
beforehand. Id. at 40-42. In either case, '"[t]he interval of time an officer must 
wait between announcement and entry depends on the circumstances of each 
case/ " State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1261 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). 
In this case, the evidence was undisputed that after Sgt. Simonson 
knocked on defendant's door, defendant twice asked who was at the door and 
Sgt. Simonson twice identified himself only by his first name. R. 178-79. The 
evidence was likewise undisputed that defendant then partially opened the 
door. However, defendant disputed the officers' testimony that Sgt. Simonson 
announced their authority and purpose and that defendant tried to close the 
door in response. See R. 179. After noting this dispute, the trial court "f [ound] 
the testimony of [the officers] to be more credible on this issue/7 R. 180. The 
court "f [ound] that the officers knocked on Defendant's door and when the door 
opened they announced they were police and that they had a search warrant/' 
R. 180. Based on these findings, the court concluded that the officer's entry "was 
reasonable and legal." R. 180. 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's factual findings on appeal. 
Instead, he challenges the court's conclusion that the officers' entry was 
reasonable. Aplt. Brf. at 5-11. In a nutshell, defendant argues that because he 
opened the door under a ruse, the officers should have waited "a reasonable 
amount of time for the Defendant to surrender his home peacefully and without 
force." Aplt. Brf. at 8-9. Defendant's argument lacks merit. 
This case is governed by State v. Floor, 2005 UT App 320,119 P.3d 305. 
There, two officers dressed in plain clothes approached Floor's home to execute a 
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search warrant. Id. at f^ 2. Thinking they had come in reference to a lost dog, a 
female resident opened the screen door from inside and initiated a conversation 
with the two officers. Id. The officers did not immediately disclose their true 
identities, but engaged in a conversation with the woman. Id. at f^ 3. After 
briefly conversing with her, one of the officers displayed his badge and 
announced that they were police serving a search warrant. Id. The woman took 
a step back in apparent retreat. Id. The officers immediately grabbed her to 
prevent her retreat, secured the home, and executed the warrant. Id. at ^ 3-4. 
On appeal, Floor argued that the officers did not wait a reasonable time 
before entering and thus violated the knock and announce rule. Id. at f 13. This 
Court rejected Floor's argument. The Court observed that where an officer is 
armed with a warrant, "'the occupant . . . ha[s] no right to refuse the officer 
admission7" once the door is open and the officer announces his or her authority 
and purpose. Id. at ^ 14 (quoting United States v. Kemp, 12 F.3d 1140,1142 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994)). 
Floor explained that the knock and announce rule serves three interests. It 
prevents "'property damage resulting from forced entry/" Id. at f^ 12 (quoting 
Buck, 756 P.2d at 701). It prevents "Violence and physical injury to both police 
and occupants which may result from an unannounced police entry/" Id. 
(quoting Buck, 756 P.2d at 701). And finally, it protects "'an individual's private 
activities within his home/" Id. (quoting Buck, 756 P.2d at 701). This interest 
"deals not with fostering complete privacy but [with] granting an opportunity 
for the party to prepare for an outside intrusion." Floor, 2005 UT App 320, f^ 14. 
In sum, the purpose of the rule is to give occupants an opportunity to open the 
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door and make them aware that police are entering their home and have 
authority to do so, not to obtain their consent. 
The Court in Floor concluded that the timing of the officer's entry was 
reasonable because the woman's step backward could reasonably be interpreted 
as an attempt to flee. Id. The Court explained that "'no interest served by the 
knock and announce statute would be furthered by requiring the officer[s] to 
stand at the open doorway for [a period of time] in order to determine whether 
the occupant means to admit [them].'" Id. at f^ 14 (quoting Kemp, 12 F.3d at 1142) 
(brackets supplied in Floor). 
As in Floor, the officers here were armed with a search warrant 
authorizing their entry into the residence. Accordingly, defendant had no right 
to refuse their admission. Id. at ^ 14; accord United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 
488 F.2d 4,11 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The simple fact is that a homeowner has no right to 
prevent officers armed with a warrant . . . from entering his home."). 
As in Floor, defendant opened the door and police announced their 
authority and purpose. When defendant attempted to shut the door, the officers 
pushed their way into the apartment before he could do so. Admittedly, the 
interval of time between announcement and entry was very short. However, the 
officers could reasonably infer a refusal to admit them or an attempt to flee when 
defendant tried to shut the door. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 43 (holding that "the 
police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the time necessary to 
infer one"); Floor, 2005 UT App 320, ^ 13 (holding that police could reasonably 
infer a retreat by resident where she stepped back in response to their 
announcement). 
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Once defendant opened the door and the officer announced their 
authority and purpose, the interests of the rule had been achieved. See Floor, 
2005 UT App 320, f^ 14. Because the door was open, the officers could enter the 
residence without destroying any property. Having opened the door, defendant 
was prepared to greet outside intruders. And finally, police entry could not at 
that point come as a surprise prompting violence in defense of habitation—the 
officer, whose badge was plainly visible on his jacket, R. 251: 7-8, identified 
himself as police and announced that he had a search warrant. See Bustamante-
Gamez, 488 F.2d at 11 (holding that the rule's "utility [to prevent violence] is 
exhausted when the actual announcement is made"). Thus, like Floor, "'no 
interest served by the knock and announce statute would be furthered by 
requiring the officer[s] to stand at the open doorway" (or in this case a soon-to-
be closed door) "for [a period of time] in order to determine whether the 
occupant mean[t] to admit [them]/" Floor, 2005 UT App 320, \ 14 (quoting 
Kemp, 12 F.3d at 1142). 
Indeed, further delay by the officers could only frustrate the purposes of 
the knock and announce rule. Defendant was suspected of dealing drugs. See R. 
6. As such, allowing him to close the door would give him an opportunity to 
destroy evidence or prepare himself to resist the entry. See Bustamante-Gamez, 
488 F.2d at 11 (observing that "if an occupant is predisposed to resist an entry by 
police, a substantial delay between announcement and entry could only give him 
time to prepare"). 
Defendant contends that the officer's use of a ruse to induce him to open 
the door compels a different result. Aplt. Brf. at 5-11. But as defendant himself 
10 
concedes, use of a ruse by police does not offend the Fourth Amendment. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 5,8. The United States Supreme Court has long acknowledged that 
"the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its 
agents" in its law enforcement activities generally. See Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206,208-09 (1966). Lower courts have uniformly recognized that police may 
use a ruse to induce a resident to open his or her door. See, e.g., United States v. 
Alejandro, 368 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir.) (holding that officer's guise as a utility employee 
checking for a gas leak to induce defendant to open the door did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment), cert, denied, 125 S.Ct. 224 (2004); Leahy v. United States, 272 
F.2d 487,490 (9th Cir. 1960) ("There is no constitutional mandate forbidding the 
use of deception in executing a valid arrest warrant."); Commonwealth v. Goggin, 
587 N.E.2d 785,787 (Mass. 1992) (holding that police were justified in preventing 
defendant from closing door after he was induced into opening door by a ruse); 
State v. Moss, 492 N.W.2d 627, (Wis. 1992) (upholding entry where in response to 
a pizza delivery ruse, defendant partially opened the door, tried to shut it after 
police announced their purpose and authority, but was prevented from doing 
so). 
Defendant argues that the ruse was unsuccessful because he did not 
consent to their entry. Aplt. Brf. at 5-11. Defendant misses the point. A warrant 
obviates the need for consent. Floor, 2005 UT App 320, \ 14. The purpose of the 
ruse was not to gain entry through consent, but to induce defendant to open the 
door. Having induced defendant to open the door, all that was required of the 
officers was to announce their authority and purpose. At that point, the manner 
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of police entry depended on defendant. He could allow the officers to enter 
peacefully or resist their entrance. Either way, police were entitled to enter. 
Defendant cites several cases from Washington and Pennsylvania in 
support of his claim that the officers violated the knock and announce rule. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 5-11. But none support his claim. In those cases, the officers' entry 
was either simultaneous with their announcement or no announcement was 
made at all. See State v. Ellis, 584 P.2d 428,431 (Wash. App. 1978) (officers' entry 
was "simultaneous with the identification"); State v. Lowrie, 528 P.2d 1010,1012 
(Wash. App. 1975) (officers announced their identity and purpose as they kicked 
in the door); State v. Bugger, 528 P.2d 274,275 (Wash. App. 1974) (officers entered 
without announcing authority and purpose); Commonwealth v. Martinelli, 729 
A.2d 628, 630 (Pa. 1999) (officer entered instantaneously with announcement); 
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 598 A.2d 539, 540 (Pa. 1991) (officer announced 
authority in purpose after entering the residence). In contrast, the officers here 
entered only after defendant attempted to shut the door in response to their 
announcement of authority and purpose. The officers thus complied with the 
knock and announce rule. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm defendant's convictions. 
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Respectfully submitted November 16, 2005. 
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Utah Attorney General 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH fliffj »«'i o r^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Joshua G. Herschi, 02-19-84 
408 W 100 South, North Unit 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
Your Affiant is Detective Sergeant Dennis G. Simonson, a police officer with the Logan City Police 
Department in Logan, Utah. Your Affiant has been so employed for over 20 years and is currently 
assigned as a supervisor of the Cache/Rich Drug Task Force. Your Affiant is a graduate of the Utah 
Police Academy and has received continual training in the investigation of all manner of criminal 
activity. Your Affiant has received specialized training in the investigation of controlled substance 
use, production, and distribution. 
Your Affiant is currently investigating Joshua G. Herschi, DOB 02-19-84 for Possession of 
Controlled Substances, to wit methamphetamine and marijuana, Utah Code 58-37-8. Joshua is 
currently living at 408 W 100 South, Logan, UT. This is a 'duplex' residence created from an 
original single family home in Logan, UT. The Herschi portion of the residence is accessed at 
the street level entrance from the north of this white house. The house is located at the 
southwest corner of 400 West and 100 South in Logan, due south of the Head Start, Logan 
Center at 75 South 400 West, Logan. 
The facts tending to establish grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows: 
1. On 1-2-04, Your Affiant received information from a concerned citizen regarding illegal 
drag use and distribution involving Joshua G. Herschi at 408 W 100 S, Logan. This 
concerned citizen (CC) wished to remain confidential for personal reasons. However, 
this person identified themself to Your Affiant and is a resident of Cache Valley. 
2. CC stated that they had personal knowledge that Joshua Herschi has been distributing 
marijuana and methamphetamine to various residents of Cache Valley for months, and 
3. 
was willing to assist in the investigation by pointing out involved residences and naming M ^ 
involved and suspected persons. T>RO&S oUEfcc S0L£> ILL«S6*ULIJ o>o H~1U(b-03, (t5f) 
By way of background knowledge on the suspect, CC stated that Joshua lives at the 
residence with Brooke and her 2-month old baby girl. Joshua is employed at Harrington 
& Co. in Hyrum and has no vehicle. Visitors and 'customers' at the residence were 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit 
named as "Linda", "Dallas", Robert Elsbury, Elizabeth Smith, Katie and Eric Fletcher, 
and Carlene, about 50 years of age with brown hair, from the Trenton area. CC has 
personally observed drug transactions inside the residence. CC pointed out 2 additional 
residences to Your Affiant involved with this group. (One of these residences will go 
unidentified in this affidavit, as the names associated with license numbers of vehicles 
observed by Your Affiant at that residence on 1-5-04 are drug-related and will be the 
subject of a separate drug investigation.) 
4. CC provided Your Affiant with a floor plan of Joshua's one bedroom residence. CC has 
personal knowledge of a mid-sized Fire-Safe in the bedroom closet in which CC has 
observed several baggies of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. 
5. Your Affiant's personal investigation confirmed via LCPD computer files that Joshua 
Herschi resides at 408 W 100 South, Logan. His data also reflects that he was arrested for 
Distribution of Marijuana in January of 2001. 
6. CC stated that Robert Elsbury and Elizabeth Smith are transient people in the valley and 
that they purchase drugs from Joshua. On 1-5-04, 1940 hours, during surveillance, Your 
Affiant observed a tan 1976 GM Van, license number 864MNF, stop at Joshua's 
residence. The vehicle's occupants entered and then left 8-10 minutes later. There were 
two persons in the van which was registered to Robert Elsbury. LCPD computer files 
reflect that he is a drug user. 
7. CC pointed out a residence at 896 W 600 South, Logan and stated the "Linda" lives there 
with her father and obtains methamphetamine from Joshua. Your Affiant has personally 
had drug-related contacts with Linda and is aware that this residence is the home of Linda 
Hyden Folia and that she has methamphetamine involvement history. Your Affiant also 
knows that her father was the owner of the house. 
8. CC mentioned "Carlene" from the Trenton area. Your Affiant believes that this Carlene 
is Carlene Fite, a current resident of Trenton, whom Your Affiant has personally 
investigated for narcotics violations and has an extensive history of methamphetamine 
use and has associated with Linda Hyden Folia. 
9. CC stated that CC suspected cohabitant "Brooke" (last name unknown) of 
methamphetamine use. Your Affiant reviewed LCPD computer data and ascertained that 
Joshua Herschi was named in an assault incident as a boyfriend of Brooke Staggi. Your 
Affiant observed a 1997 Mazda, license number 157LYA, registered to Krista Staggi at 
the residence on 1-5-04. Brooke's identity was confirmed by Your Affiant. 
10. Your Affiant believes that the infomiation provided by CC is accurate and reliable, as CC 
provided CC's identification and contact information. CC has also provided infomiation 
that has been verified - nothing has proven inaccurate. Your Affiant noted also that this 
information was derived by firsthand knowledge. 
11. Your Affiant believes that probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant of 
Joshua G. Herschi, his residence and all outbuildings or storage areas, located at 408 W 
100 South, Logan. Your Affiant also requests to search any of the above named 
individuals and their respective vehicles if they are present aMhe time of service of the 
search warrant. 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit 
This is based on the aforementioned facts and circumstances. 
DATED ON THIS THE i> DAY OF JANUARY 
S^^V***— 
Sergeant Dennis G. Simonson 
Cache/Rich Drag Task Force 
SWORN TO, AND SUBSCRIBED IN MY PRESENCE THIS THE 
2004. 
6 DAY OF JANUARY, 
A, 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit 
DISTRICT C p i I R T , p r 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
y n r - i - s pi: t;P7 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Joshua G. Herschi, 02-19-84 
408 W 100 South/ Kiotn-i 
Logan, UT 84321 
Defendant 
u w i r j ^ 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE 
OF UTAH: 
Proof of affidavit was made before me this day by Sergeant Dennis Simonson that there is probable 
cause for issuance of a search warrant, as more fully set forth in the affidavit on file with the District 
Court. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search, during daytime hours, with 
the necessity of giving previous notice of: 
1. Joshua G. Herschi, Brooke Staggi, their residence and all outbuildings or storage areas, 
located at 408 W 100 SouthlLoganTiour Affiant also requests to search any of the 
named individuals in the affidavit (''Linda", "Dallas", Robert Elsbury, Elizabeth Smith, 
Katie and Eric Fletcher, and "Carlene") and their respective vehicles if they are present at 
the time of service of the search warrant or immediately preceding the service of the 
search warrant. 
FOR THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY: 
Any methamphetamine or marijuana material, and any tools, devices, instruments, or other 
controlled substances, or any written documents pertaining to the use of, and/or distribution of any 
controlled substance prohibited by the Utah Controlled Substance Act. Also any dominion and 
control papers, computer records, effects, keys, photographs, and any other items which tends to 
prove ownership of said property; which property or evidence: was unlawfully acquired, is 
unlawfully possessed, or has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, and/or consists of an 
item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, to wit; 
Possession and/or Distribution of a Controlled Substance to wit methamphetamine or 
marijuana, in violation of section 58-37-8, UCA, and/or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant: Page 1 of 2 
violation of section 58-37A-5, UCA. 
If you find any of the property described above, or any part thereof, bring it before me immediately 
at this court and make a return within 10 days, as required by U.C.A. 77-23-7 and 77-23-9. 
DATE SIGNED: Jew) (A^UV &( J~°0*TME SIGNED: <f \ (0 0, i/U), 




IN AND FOR LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant: Page 2 of 2 
CACHE/RICH DRUG TASK FORi^ 
290 North 100 West
 K 
Logan, UT 84321 JUV:";-. 
435-716-9300 or 435-716-9381 
RETURN ON SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant: Joshua Herschi 
Case#:04-SF4 
I received the attached Search Warrant on January 6, 2004, and have executed it as 
follows: On January 6, 2004,1 executed the Search Warrant and searched the premise 
located at 408 West 100 South, Logan, Utah as described in the warrant. 
The following is an inventory of property taken pursuant to the warrant: 
Evidence Item #: 
1. Bag containing 15 smaller bags of marijuana 
2. Set of digital scales 
3. Bundle of plastic baggies 
4. Norin Co. SKS, serial # 30446, and a 30 round magazine 
5. One sword 
6. Four Federal shotgun shells 
7. Pen tooter QA) 
8. Three $100 bills and two $20 bills 
9. Miscellaneous items of drug paraphernalia 
10. Two pink "OC" pills 
11. One Winchester 30.06 bullet and one .38 Special bullet 
12. Bag of marijuana 
13. Empty bags with residue 
14. One Tupperware with 12 bags of marijuana 
15. Two baggies of methamphetamine in safe 
16. Sentry safe 
This evidence was made in the presence of Cpt. Eric Collins, Bill Nyberg, Justin Peterson, and 
Alan Hodges. I, Sgt. Dennis Simonson, the officer by whom this warrant was executed, do 
swear the above inventory contains a true and detailed account of all property taken by me during 
the search of said address and is being held in the evidence room at the Logan City Police 
Department. 
Sgt. Dennis Simonson 
Cache/Rich Drug Task Force 




IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
, — _ _ -
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff, * MEMORANDUM DECISION 
v. * 
JOSHUA G. HERSCHI, * Case No: 041100017 FS 
* 
Defendant. * 
This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Each party filed a 
memorandum in support of their positions on the motion. A hearing was held on May 18,2004. 
At the hearing, Mr. Herschi testified together with Detective Dennis Simonson and Deputy Bill 
Nyberg. 
There are two issues raised in Defendant's Motion to Suppress. First, what constitutes 
"knock and announce" by an officer in serving a search warrant? Second, is serving a warrant at 
8:30 p.m. a proper service during the "daytime"? 
1. What constitutes knock and announce by an officer while serving a search warrant? 
On January 6, 2004, Officer Simonson obtained a search warrant for Defendant's house. 
Defendant does not contest the validity of the search warrant. Defendant only contests the 
execution of the search warrant. 
The search warrant was served on Defendant's residence on January 6, 2004, between 
8:00 and 8:30 p.m. The warrant was served by Detective Simonson and Deputy Nyberg. Many of 
the facts on how the warrant was served are not disputed by the Defendant. The witnesses agree 
that Detective Simonson knocked on the door to the residence. A male voice from inside the 
house responded by asking "Who is it?" Detective Simonson answered "Dennis." The male voice 
'1 
within the residence then said "Who?" Detective Simonson then responded "Dennis." The door 
then opened approximately 10 to 15 inches. 
At this point, Detective Simonson and Officer Nyberg testified that Detective Simonson 
said "Police. We have a warrant." The Defendant disputes that Detective Simonson announced 
that he was a police officer and that he had a warrant. Detective Simonson also testified that he 
was wearing a jacket with his police badge attached at the zipper just below his chin. 
The officers testified that the male individual on the other side of the door attempted to 
close it. Defendant disputes this fact and testified that he did not attempt to close the door. The 
officers testified they struggled to force the door open, finally gaining entrance. 
The officers then executed the search warrant and found controlled substances, 
paraphernalia and a weapon. Defendant's motion seeks to suppress the evidence obtained as a 
result of the execution of the search warrant. 
As stated, the issue before the Court is what constitutes a legal "knock and announce" 
execution of a search warrant? In analyzing this issue the Court must consider the purpose of the 
"knock and announce" requirement. Because individuals have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their homes, the Constitution requires an officer to knock and announce his identity 
and purpose prior to the execution of the warrant. This is to fulfill an individuals reasonable right 
to privacy and to prevent individuals from being hurt or harmed in the execution of the warrant 
and to protect the destruction of personal property in the execution of a warrant.Therefore, this 
case hinges on what an officer must do and say to legally execute a "knock and announce" 
warrant. 
Case law and U.C.A. § 77-23-210 directs that a police officer must give notice 
("announce") his authority and purpose before he can forcefully enter a house. Therefore, did 
Detective Simonson properly give notice of his authority and purpose before the officers forced 
Defendant's door open? The Court finds that this issue is analyzed on a reasonableness basis as 
stated in United States v. Banks. 123 S. Ct. 521, 524 (2003). 
In this case, Detective Simonson and Deputy Nyberg both testified that when the house 
door was opened 10 to 15 inches, Detective Simonson loudly said "Police. We have a search 
warrant." Both testified the Defendant then tried to close the door. Mr. Herschi testified he did 
not hear Detective Simonson say "police" or "we have a search warrant." 
The Court finds the testimony of Simonson and Nyberg to be more credible on this issue. 
The Court finds that the officers knocked on Defendant's door and when the door was opened 
they announced they were police and that they had a search warrant. The Court finds that the 
manner in which they executed the search warrant was reasonable and legal. Therefore, the 
police officers properly executed the knock and announce warrant, and this portion of 
Defendant's motion is denied. 
2. Was serving the search warrant at 8:30 p.m. a proper service during the "daytime"? 
The warrant issued for Defendant's house was authorized to be served "during daytime 
hours." It is undisputed that the warrant was executed at approximately 8:30 p.m. Defendant 
asserts that serving the warrant at 8:30 p.m. is not "during daytime hours," so the warrant was 
illegally served. 
The Utah Legislature has enacted U.C.A. § 77-23-201(1) which defines "daytime" for 
purposes of search warrants as " . . . the hours beginning at 6:00 a.m. and ending at 10:00 p.m. 
local time." The service of the warrant in this case was at 8:30 p.m. which is within the defined 
time period. 
Defendant presents no case law or statute that defines daytime as something different. 
Defendant simply argues "daytime" means while the sun is up. Defendant has failed to present 
any precedence to persuade the Court that it should disregard U.C.A. § 77-23-201. Therefore, 
Defendant's motion is denied. Counsel for the State to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this 15th day of July, 2004. 
^ ; p p 2 3 r w BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 041100017 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail A. W. LAURITZEN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
15 E 600 N 
P.O. BOX 171 
LOGAN, UT 84321-0171 
Mail BRUCE WARD 
ATTORNEY PLA 
11 W 100 N 
LOGAN UT 84321 
Dated t h i s A day of U,LJU , 20^V . 
V^  
Deputy Court Clerk 
P^a^ 1 HasM 
BRUCE WARD, UBN 7666 
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE 
11 WEST 100 NORTH 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
TELEPHONE: (435) 716-8361 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
Plaintiff, TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
vs. 
Case No. 041100017 
JOSHUA G. HERSCHI, 
Defendant. Judge Thomas Willmore 
It is hereby, ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is, for 
reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated 15 July 2004, DENIED. The 
warrant was executed on the defendant's residence in a reasonable and legal manner. 
Furthermore, it was executed between 8:00 and 8:30 PM which is within the statutory 
definition of "daytime service." See, Utah Code anno. 77-23-201. 
DATED this %(p day of July, 2004 
